Allocation of Fault and Products Liability: A Comment on Safety Products and Human Error by Van Flein, Thomas V.
VAN FLEIN_FMT.DOC 05/13/02 10:13 AM
141
ALLOCATION OF FAULT AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A
COMMENT ON SAFETY
PRODUCTS AND HUMAN ERROR
THOMAS V. VAN FLEIN*
This Comment examines Alaska law regarding products li-
ability and the application of allocation of fault principles.
It begins with an analysis of products liability as a non-fault
based doctrine that nevertheless encounters fault-based
principles when comparative fault is evaluated.  The Com-
ment describes a subcategory of products that the author
calls “safety products,” those products that are specially de-
signed and conceived to account for human error or negli-
gence.  The author contends that within this product sub-
category lies the potential to virtually immunize safety
product manufacturers for manufacturing defective prod-
ucts when pure allocation of fault principles are applied.
The author questions whether the legislature or the courts
should examine if such a reduction in potential liability
comports with the purposes of products liability law and
fundamental fairness.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In most litigation involving injury from a defective product, an
attempt to allocate fault represents the judicious weighing of fac-
tors that allows the trier of fact to assess blame for the real cause of
an incident and impose liability for damages.  If more than one de-
fendant caused the injuries, then more than one defendant shall be
liable.  Under Alaska law, each defendant will be allocated a spe-
cific percentage of fault.1  Similarly, if the plaintiff is found through
carelessness, drunkenness or some other mistake in judgment to be
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1. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(a) & (b) (Michie 2000).
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responsible (in whole or part) for his or her injuries, the trier of
fact reduces the recovery accordingly.2
While such pure allocation of fault has its supporters and its
opponents, for the moment at least, it is the law in Alaska.3  How-
ever, this mechanism for allocating fault does produce an unin-
tended consequence.  By reducing the potential damages or elimi-
nating them altogether, the allocation of fault principles may
convey partial or whole immunity on safety product manufactur-
ers.4
Examples of safety products include airbags,5 seat belts,6 gun
safeties, safety goggles, machine guards, railings, “child-proof” lids,
2. Id.
3. Id. § 09.17.080 (requiring apportionment of damages in “all actions in-
volving fault of more than one person”).
4. The term “safety products” as used herein means products that are de-
signed to prevent injury or death as a result of human error.  Thus, the sine qua
non for the development of many of these products is a known human propensity
to err and the need for a design to minimize the risk of such error or minimize the
harm when such an error occurs.  This type of product is often corollary to the
main product, and may have no real purpose in the function of the underlying
product other than safety.  The doctrine addressing reasonable alternative design
could be defined to include safety products, since, from the consumer’s perspec-
tive, the main product and the safety product are one packaged product.
5. “Air bags have been proven effective at saving lives in frontal crashes.  Air
bags have also been shown to present a risk of death or injury in certain situa-
tions.” NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL INDICATIONS FOR AIR BAG
DISCONNECTION, THE RONALD REAGAN INSTITUTE OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE,
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE AND THE NATIONAL CRASH ANALYSIS
CENTER, FINAL REPORT, 1 (1997), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/airbags/
air%20bag%20cont%20rpt.html (last visited April 3, 2002).  The statistics re-
garding the benefits of air bags are impressive.  The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) calculated that, as of October 1999, 4,758 lives
were saved as a result of airbag deployments.  NHTSA Safety Fact Sheet, Nov. 2,
1999, available at www.nhtsa.gov/airbags/factsheets/numbers/html.  Conversely,
146 deaths have been attributed to airbag deployment.  Id.  Sometimes airbags fail
to deploy when they should have.  See NHTSA, MONTHLY DEFECT REPORT
(2001) (citing 1998-1999 Ford Escort for airbag non-deployment), available at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/defect/monthly/2001/200106.html (last vi-
sited Mar. 22, 2002).
6. The NHTSA also concluded that seatbelts save 11,000 lives annually, a
very impressive accomplishment indicative of a remarkable safety product.
NHTSA, SAFETY FACT SHEET (1999), available at www.nhtsa.gov/airbags/
factsheets/numbers/html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).  However, some seatbelts
have been recalled or found defective in circumstances where the webbing was
inadequate or the seatbelt separated from the anchor. See, e.g., NHTSA,
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lighters7 or matches, safety harnesses, helmets or hard hats,8 safety
glass, safety valves (e.g., pressure release valves), smoke detectors,
automatic headlights for motorcycles and cars, roll-bars, fire-
extinguishers or sprinkler systems, garage door sensors and emer-
gency locator beacons.  Although many more safety products un-
doubtedly exist, this list conveys the types of products at issue
here.9
Each of these products was designed (or the main product was
redesigned) and manufactured as a result of documented and con-
sistent human error.  If people obeyed all traffic laws, the need for
seat belts would be minimal.10  If people obeyed proper gun safety
MONTHLY DEFECT REPORT (2001) (1999-2000 Ford Explorer XLS, seat belt web-
bing, 1995-1999 GM Tahoe, seat belt anchorage separation).
7. For example, in 1998 the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
(“CPSC”), in conjunction with five lighter importers, recalled about 840,000 dis-
posable cigarette lighters.  The lighters apparently did not have child-resistant
mechanisms to prevent young children from igniting them, or they had defective
child-resistant mechanisms in violation of the Consumer Product Safety Act.  See
CPSC, CPSC, ERA Intermarketing Co. Inc. Announce Recall of Disposable Light-
ers (1998), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml98/98094.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
8. In Mine Safety Appliances Co. v.  Stiles, the plaintiff alleged that his safety
helmet was defective.  756 P.2d 288, 289 (Alaska 1988).
9. In addition to safety products, elements of product design are incorpo-
rated within the product specifically to provide additional safety to the consumer,
such as a “nonencroachment zone” or “survival space” in a vehicle whereby the
roof and body form a safety cage in the event of a crash or rollover.  See, e.g., Lar-
sen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (“A manufacturer
is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicles to avoid sub-
jecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.”).
When the alleged design defect is the lack of a safety device, courts may impose a
different standard if the defense of comparative negligence is raised.  See Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 892 (Alaska 1979), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981) (“When the design defect is the lack of a
safety device, the jury may be instructed that the plaintiff may be comparatively
negligent in the knowing use of a defective product only if he voluntarily and un-
reasonably encounters the known risk.”) (emphasis added); see also Dura Corp. v.
Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 404-05 (Alaska 1985) (affirming standard requiring proof of
the consumer’s actual knowledge of the product’s defect (including the lack of a
safety device) and proof that the consumer voluntarily used the product and un-
reasonably encountered a known risk).
10. Traffic laws almost uniformly prohibit unsafe driving, excessive speed,
driving while impaired, following too closely, and just about every type of driving
error that results in vehicle accidents.  See United States Department of Transpo-
ration (“USDOT”) Federal Highway Administration, Part VI of the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (1995 ed.), available at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.
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procedures, even a gun safety mechanism would be superfluous.11
The product design thus has its genesis in human ignorance or just
plain carelessness—the usual defenses offered before the trier of
fact when arguing comparative fault.  Yet these human attributes
are the same faults that would, under a pure allocation of fault
analysis, reduce, if not eliminate, liability in the event the safety
product failed or was otherwise defective.
This Comment questions that result as a normative judgment
and posits that neither the legislature nor the judiciary intended
this undesirable result as it undermines the basic goals of products
liability.  The touchstone of products liability is risk allocation.12
Liability imposed against the product manufacturer for economic
and non-economic harm caused to consumers transfers the real
costs of defective products to the manufacturers and retailers13
(who profit from the products) rather than the injured consumers
or society as a whole. The Alaska Supreme Court has emphasized
that the fundamental policy supporting products liability is “to in-
sure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are
[sic] borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves.”14
The manufacturer is obligated to design a product that consid-
ers not only its intended use, but also any reasonably foreseeable
product use.15  For safety product manufacturers, this includes the
gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).  The federal government concluded that, in 1996,
there were “[a]pproximately 6,800,000 crashes . . . in the United States each year.”
NHTSA, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1996, USDOT (1997).  The NHTSA has a
“Speed Management Team” that provides “speed management” information to
“improve highway safety.”  With 6.8 million vehicle accidents per year, it is abun-
dantly clear that millions of people violate traffic safety laws or practices, or can
be deemed negligent.
11. The National Rifle Association has published various safety rules, includ-
ing the following: “(1) Always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction. . . .  A safe
direction means that the gun is pointed so that even if it were to go off it would not
cause injury or damage; (2) Always keep your finger off the trigger until ready to
shoot . . . (3) Always keep the gun unloaded until ready to use.”  See National Ri-
fle Association, National Rifle Association Gun Safety Rules, available at
http://www.nrahq.org/education/guide.asp (last visited March 29, 2002).
12. Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
13. Id. at 248; see also Pratt v. Whitney Can. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176
(Alaska 1993) (using the same language).
14. Clary, 454 P.2d at 248.
15. In determining whether a particular use (or misuse) is “foreseeable,” the
focus is on what is foreseeable to the manufacturer, not the consumer.  See Hiller
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potential negligence of the consumer or a third party.  As noted by
some courts, manufacturers “are charged with the knowledge that
their automobiles will sometimes be involved in an accident or col-
lison, including accidents involving negligent and sometimes even
drunk drivers, and to reasonably design and build safe vehicles
based upon that knowledge.”16
II. THE DECISION IN GMC V. FARNSWORTH AS A CASE STUDY
A. The Facts and Ruling
The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in GMC v. Farnsworth17
presents a good example of what may be at issue when comparative
fault principles, particularly pure allocation of fault among all par-
ties, are applied to safety products cases.  In Farnsworth, the con-
sumer plaintiff—a passenger in a vehicle—sued the vehicle manu-
facturer for designing a defective seat restraint system.18  She
claimed that the seat belts in the vehicle were defective for shorter
than average people and that her indisputably serious injuries “re-
sulted from ‘submarining’ under her lap belt.”19  The court ex-
plained:
Farnsworth argued that she had submarined under the lap belt
because GM’s defective design only protected individuals the
size of an average man or larger.  Therefore, she claimed, Fennie
[the driver], who at 175 pounds and 5’11” was slightly larger than
an average sized man, walked away from the accident, whereas
she, at 129 pounds and 5’3”, nearly died.20
After a trial, the consumer prevailed with a substantial ver-
dict.21 The manufacturer primarily defended under a product mis-
use theory, contending that the consumer’s injuries resulted “from
the severity of the accident and her own misuse of the belt.”22
v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska 1983); Lamer v. McKee In-
dus., Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska 1986).
16. D’Amario v. Ford Motor Company, 806 So.2d 424, 439 (Fla. 2002).
17. 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
18. Id. at  1211.
19. Id. at 1212.
20. Id.
21. The court noted that the “jury returned a verdict for Farnsworth, awarding
her $2,138,973 in compensatory damages and $5,600,000 in punitive damages.” Id.
at 1214.
22. Id. at 1213. (“GM claimed that Farnsworth had misused the belt by wear-
ing it under her arm.  GM theorized that due to this misuse, Farnsworth had
“jacknifed” over the belt, which in turn had caused all of her significant injuries.”)
Id.
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B. Reasoning Behind the Decision in GMC v. Farnsworth
In reversing the verdict, the supreme court made several rul-
ings that form the basis for the safety products issue here.  The
court held that the trial court “erred in rejecting a comparative
negligence instruction and refusing to require the jury to allocate
fault to the driver who caused the accident.”23  The court appropri-
ately concluded that the trial court should have included a jury in-
struction regarding product misuse, i.e., whether the consumer im-
properly wore the seat belt.24  Alaska law had previously
recognized product misuse as a defense, however, so this aspect of
the ruling was predictable.
The court broke new ground, however, on the allocation of
fault issue.  The court described the manufacturer’s assertion of the
following defenses:
GM stressed that even if its seat restraint system were defective,
Farnsworth’s injuries were largely the fault of Fennie [the driver
of the vehicle with Farnsworth] and Walters [the oncoming
driver].  GM argued that Farnsworth did not contest that Wal-
ters was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the acci-
dent and that his negligence in driving in the wrong lane was the
immediate cause of the collision.  In fact, GM claimed, Walters
had admitted that he was drug impaired, and he was tried and
convicted of criminal assault in the fourth degree for causing
personal injury to Fennie and Farnsworth.  GM also attributed
fault to Fennie, arguing that the collision would have been less
severe if he had braked more quickly.  GM claimed that Fennie’s
own driving had been impaired by alcohol.25
The court held that these facts warranted an instruction that
the oncoming driver was liable as a matter of law for the con-
sumer’s injuries since the oncoming driver was the original tortfea-
sor.  The court reasoned:
No one disputed that Walters’s negligence in fact caused the ac-
cident.  Analogizing to other areas of tort law, GM argues that
the original tortfeasor is always considered a legal cause of a
plaintiff’s further injuries unless there is a superseding cause . . . .
GM’s position is consistent with related tort principles.  [For ex-
ample,] [a]n original tortfeasor is considered a proximate cause,
as a matter of law, of injuries caused by subsequent negligent
medical treatment.26
23. Id. at 1211.
24. Id. at 1217 (noting that the instructions “may have suggested to [the jury]
that GM could be held fully liable for Farnsworth’s injuries even if she had worn
the belt under her arm”).
25. Id. at 1213-14.
26. Id. at 1217.
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Thus, the court transplanted a tort doctrine from medical malprac-
tice cases to products liability,27 without much reflection on the dif-
ferent nature between the two. The justification for this rule is that
it is foreseeable from the perspective of the original tortfeasor that
an injured person may be injured again through medical malprac-
tice. Thus, the reasoning goes, the original tortfeasor should be li-
able for the negligent actions of the treating physicians.
Physicians are not, however, in the business of manufacturing
safety products aimed at reducing or eliminating injuries prior to
the occurrence of the injuries.  Rather, their expertise is called into
action only after someone has been injured.  This is a fundamental
difference that renders the tort doctrine of allocating fault to the
original tortfeasor essentially meaningless in a safety products case
unless the safety products manufacturer is considered the original
tortfeasor. In short, the court’s analogy begs the question: who is
the original tortfeasor in a products liability safety products case?
The manufacturer who designed and marketed a product with an-
ticipated errors and accidents in mind or the inevitable careless
third party?28  Would not the safety product manufacturer be able
to foresee that an injured customer may be injured further by a
negligent doctor if their safety product failed?
Even more fundamentally, the court in Farnsworth overlooked
the established principle that “a reasonably foreseeable occurrence
cannot be an intervening/superseding cause if the actor has a duty
to prevent that occurrence.”29  The safety product manufacturer has
intentionally taken on the duty of preventing or reducing the risk
of injury to consumers (whether the injury is caused by an oncom-
ing motorist or subsequent medical malpractice after being rushed
27. This doctrine was explained, for example, in Dumas v. State, 804
So.2d 813, 815 (La. App. 2001), where the court reasoned that “an original
tortfeasor may be held liable not only for the injuries he directly causes, but
also for the tort victim’s additional suffering caused by inappropriate medical
treatment.  Under a duty risk analysis, ‘[t]he original tortfeasor’s responsibil-
ity may extend to the risk involved in the human fallibility of physicians, sur-
geons, nurses, and hospital staff which is inherent to the necessity of seeking
medical treatment.’”
28. For example, Florida recognizes the rule that the original tortfeasor is li-
able for all foreseeable harm, and medical malpractice is a foreseeable result when
someone has been injured.  See Stuart v. Hertz, 351 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1977). The
court in Letzter v. Cephas reasoned that “[w]hen the rule in Stuart v. Hertz applies,
the initial tortfeasor’s remedy against the succeeding negligent health care pro-
vider lies in an action for subrogation.” 792 So.2d 481, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).  The concurrence pointed out that under an allocation of fault system, the
remedy is for the original tortfeasor to seek allocation of fault against the negli-
gent physician.  Id. at 488.
29. Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 (Alaska 2001).
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to the hospital).  Thus, in the case of safety products, since the
manufacturer has taken on the duty to protect the consumer from
foreseeable injuries, then the safety product manufacturer should
be deemed the original tortfeasor if that product is defective or
failed.  In Farnsworth, the seatbelt manufacturer should have been
deemed the original tortfeasor, not the third-party driver.  Thus,
even if the analogy was correct, its application was misdirected.
Courts do not treat a subsequent malpractice defendant as a joint
tortfeasor with the initial tortfeasor.30  A subsequent malpractice
defendant is not liable for the initial injuries that sent the injured
person to the hospital in the first place: “The essential point is that
under the crashworthiness doctrine, as in medical malpractice
cases, the initial collision is simply not at issue.”31  Unfortunately,
the proximate causation theory pertaining to generic tort cases is
now engrafted for the moment in safety products cases.
The practical implication of the decision in Farnsworth is
worth repeating: since Farnsworth would not have been injured but
for the third-party driver being impaired and driving carelessly, the
performance of the seatbelt32 is immaterial.  Consequently, a trier
of fact could reasonably conclude that the drunk driver is 100 per-
cent liable for the injuries and thus the seatbelt becomes legally
immaterial, since it is called into play only after someone else has
failed to exercise due care.
The appropriate analysis under these circumstances was de-
veloped by the Florida Supreme Court in D’Amario v. Ford Motor
Co.33  In D’Amario, the court addressed whether allocation of fault
30. D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 435 (Fla. 2002).
31. Id. at 437.
32. One medical study addresses the role of seatbelts in diminishing injuries or
causing additional injuries:
Among the 15 patients who used a shoulder strap and lap belt device
(three-point restraint), 12 patients sustained burst fractures (80%) com-
pared with 4 of the 14 patients (28.6%) restrained with lap seat belts
alone.  Life-threatening intra-abdominal injuries occurred in 57.1% of
lap-belted victims and in 26.7% of patients who used three-point re-
straints, and the character of these injuries also differed.  No patients in
an automobile in which an air bag deployed sustained major associated
bodily injuries.  Among restrained occupants of head-on motor vehicle
accidents who have sustained a thoracolumbar fracture, patients using
lap belts are more likely to sustain the classic flexion-distraction injury
patterns, whereas patients using three-point restraints may sustain a
higher incidence of burst fractures.  In addition, three-point restraints are
associated with a decreased risk of intra-abdominal injury compared with
lap seat belts.
Scott T. Ball et al., Injuries of the Thoracolumbar Spine Associated With Restraint
Use in Head-on Motor Vehicle Accidents, 13 J. SPINAL DISORDERS 297, 297 (2000).
33. 806 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2002).
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principles should apply to crashworthiness or enhanced injury
cases.  The court held that “principles of comparative fault con-
cerning apportionment of fault as to the cause of the underlying
crash will not ordinarily apply in crashworthiness or enhanced in-
jury cases.”34  This is, of course, precisely the view proposed in this
Comment relative not just to enhanced injury cases but to safety
products as well.
The D’Amario court defined the scope of its ruling as applying
to claims for injuries not arising out of the initial collision, “but for
those sustained in the second impact where some design defect
caused an exacerbated injury which would not have otherwise oc-
curred as a result of the original collision.”35  As in Farnsworth, the
driver of the vehicle in D’Amario was intoxicated and was speed-
ing.  The injured passenger brought suit against the manufacturer
alleging product defect regarding a fuel relay switch that allegedly
malfunctioned and continued to pump gas, resulting in a fire that
severely burned the plaintiff.  The manufacturer sought to appor-
tion fault to the driver.  However, the court rejected any appor-
tionment of fault to the negligent third party, reasoning that “to
permit a manufacturer to apportion fault with a third party . . . in
causing the accident, manufacturers would effectively avoid liabil-
ity for designing and manufacturing a defective product, and would
thus countermine the essential purpose” of products liability.36
Noting Florida’s apportionment of fault statute, which is essentially
identical to Alaska’s, the court held that “the initial accident
merely furnished the occasion for the manufacturer’s fault to be
tested” and “the cause of the initial collision is simply not at issue
in the determination of the cause of the second collision” involving
product defect.37  The D’Amario reasoning is the appropriate
analysis under Alaska law as well.
C.  Implications of the Decision in GMC v. Farnsworth
This decision represents a considerable and somewhat unprin-
cipled expansion of the allocation of fault defense, allowing any-
one’s negligence to reduce liability, not just the consumer’s as-
sumption of the risk or awareness of a product defect.38  Now, fault
34. Id. at 426.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 434.
37. Id. at 437.
38. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 892 (Alaska 1979), rev’d
in part on other grounds, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981).
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can be allocated (and must be to some degree as a matter of law)39
against the “original tortfeasor.”  By definition, the original tort-
feasor caused the incident and the failure of a safety product—de-
signed with the “original tortfeasor” in mind—becomes secondary
at best.  In a prior article, I noted the practical effect this ruling
may have:
While the court left it open for the jury to determine the actual
percentage of fault to be allocated to the original tortfeasor (but
noted that at least 1% must be allocated as a matter of law), the
practical effect will likely be a complete or majority allocation of
fault to the original tortfeasor.  When faced with a defective seat
belt, brake system or airbag, versus a drunk driver (or a driver
impaired by cocaine, as in Farnsworth), it would not be unrea-
sonable for a jury to assign virtually all fault to the impaired third
party driver. . . .  By allowing the harm caused by defective safety
products to be reduced or offset completely, this decision over-
looks the controlling purpose of products liability law: making
products safer and allocating risks from the innocent consumer
to those who profit from the product.  It further glosses over the
fact that vehicle safety features assume by their very existence
that a driver will act negligently, thus causing an accident.  Ac-
cordingly, in all but the most bizarre incidents, where a vehicle
safety feature proves to be defective in that it fails to perform as
an ordinary consumer would expect or fails when compared to
the benefits of an alternative design, there may still be no liabil-
ity for the resulting harm since the “original tortfeasor,” i.e.,
whoever is the negligent driver, is liable as a matter of law.40
Impaired drivers already (and deservedly) face the wrath of
the public and the law.  In fact, the most recent amendments to
Alaska’s drunk driving statutes point out that “Alaska has one of
the toughest drunk driving laws in the United States . . . . [Drunk
drivers] kill, injure, and maim Alaskans causing untold grief, pain,
suffering, and economic loss.”41  Given that the law already pun-
39. GMC, 965 P.2d at 1217.  The court reasoned that the driver of the other
vehicle is “liable as a matter of law” for some of the plaintiff’s injuries, notwith-
standing the plaintiff’s claim that a defect in the vehicle’s safety features failed to
prevent the harm.  Id.
40. Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts, Products Liability in Alaska, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 24 n.145 (2000) (em-
phasis added).
41. The full quote of Representative Norman Rokeberg, sponsor of the legis-
lation, is as follows:
Alaska has one of the toughest drunk driving laws in the United States,
but many of our state’s habitual drunk drivers are not getting the mes-
sage. Senate Committee Substitute for Judiciary Committee Amended
Substitute for House Bill 4 creates the toughest set of driving under the
influence (“DUI”) laws in the country.
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ishes the socially reprehensible misconduct of drunk drivers, good
public policy should not allow the manufacturer to escape its share
of liability for exacerbated injuries suffered by the plaintiff.  Courts
have recognized that allowing a jury to allocate fault to third par-
ties, particularly drunk or impaired drivers, will confuse juries as to
the real issue to be tried and that “such confusion is magnified in
cases . . . involv[ing] intoxicated drivers, due in large measure to
the public’s understandable intolerance for drunk driving.”42
The Farnsworth approach to third-party allocation of fault
may give rise to considerable unfairness.  That there are careless
and drunk drivers on the highway is a well-known fact.  Manufac-
turers of automobiles specifically took that fact into account and
attempted to provide a product that would reduce or eliminate the
risk of serious injury if a consumer was involved in one of the mil-
lions of accidents that occur yearly.  If its product is defective and if
that defect causes injury to a consumer, under present law the
manufacturer can simply point to the original tortfeasor (in this
case, the third-party drunk driver) and argue that nothing would
have happened had the third-party defendant not driven drunk and
recklessly.  While factually correct, that argument fails to address
the product defect and allows the manufacturer of a safety product
to escape liability and continue to manufacture and market poten-
tially defective products.  Thus, the manufacturer escapes penalty
when its product fails in the very purpose for which it was designed
and marketed, a purpose upon which the consumer likely relied in
purchasing and using the product.
The court in Farnsworth appropriately noted that “[t]ort law
seeks to deter future behavior that exposes others to injury.”43  In
the case of tort actions involving safety products where third-party
negligence is invoked, tort law will act as a deterrent largely to the
original tortfeasor, not the product manufacturer. This result will
not promote product safety.
Poor judgment and chemical dependency are the primary causes of ha-
bitual drinking and driving. These people kill, injure, and maim Alaskans
causing untold grief, pain, suffering, and economic loss.
Sponsor Comments, Rep. Norman Rokeberg, available at http://www.akrepubli-
cans.org/22ndleg/spst/spsthb004.shtml (last modified May 7, 2001) (emphasis in
original).
42. D’Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 439 (Fla. 2002).
43. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1218.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF ALLOCATION OF FAULT IN ALASKA
A.  The Genesis of Safety Products
The birth of safety products (and the creation of several indus-
tries devoted to safety) was not an isolated event.  Safety products
share the same source as the legal doctrine of comparative fault—
human carelessness and a propensity to err.  It requires no citation
to establish that humans are prone to error.  Disciplines are de-
voted to this truism, both from an engineering perspective44 and a
psychological perspective.45
The propensity of people to err has led product manufacturers
to add safety features to existing products or design safety products
from the outset.  Not all agree that safety can be sold as an attrib-
ute, but the lack of safety can be used as an incentive to improve
product performance through product liability judgments or set-
tlements.  For example, Judge Posner reasoned that such judg-
ments would encourage the adoption of safer designs:
If advertising and marketing a safety improvement are thus dis-
couraged, the incentive to adopt such improvements is reduced.
But make the producer liable for the consequence of a hazard-
ous product, and no question of advertising safety improvements
to consumers will arise.  He will adopt cost-justified precautions
not to divert sales from competitors but to minimize liability to
injured consumers.46
Other scholars reason that the promotion of safety as a product
feature is a key component of some products (i.e., the safety prod-
ucts at issue here).  Manufacturers often then tout the additional
safety provided by their products as a reason to buy:
All bicycle stores carry helmets and those helmets are virtually
always displayed openly and in the same showroom as the bikes
. . . .  Although some consumers do express safety concerns, they
generally arrive at the store with those concerns in mind, and the
presence of a range of helmets is often a source of some com-
fort—not the other way around.
44. See generally HENRY PETROSKI, TO ENGINEER IS HUMAN: THE ROLE OF
FAILURE IN SUCCESSFUL DESIGN (1985).
45. For example, in its landmark study, the National Academy of Sciences
reasoned that “human beings, in all lines of work, make errors.  Errors can be
prevented by designing systems that make it hard for people to do the wrong
thing . . . .  Cars are designed so that drivers cannot start them while in reverse.”
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM IX (2000).
46. Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211
(1973).
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The actual marketing of bicycle helmets, moreover, seems more
consistent with our story of manufacturers leading consumers to
underestimate product risks, in this case by overstating the de-
gree to which the precautionary product will help to prevent
harm.  Many of the advertisements appear designed to impart to
consumers a feeling of control over the risks of cycling through
their selection of a helmet.  For instance, Bell Sports, the world’s
largest manufacturer of bicycle helmets, features images of ex-
hilarating off-road mountain biking in its marketing, along with
the slogan, “Courage for Your Head.” The website for Cratoni
Helmets, a leading German manufacturer, sports a video intro-
duction of mountain scenes, a revolving helmet, and alternating
flashes of the messages, “Cratoni Helmets” and “No Limits.”
That company’s Mountain Maniac line of helmets is described as
follows: “What are you—CRAZY?  We hope so because this
helmet was designed for you.  Are you drooling over it yet? . . .
The Maniac encourages you to push the limit . . . .”  Even buyers
of the company’s less aggressive “Leisure” line of helmets are
assured that “[c]asual rides through the city park are more fun
when you are confident in your safety.”47
This type of marketing underscores a consumer’s expectations re-
garding a product’s safety features and the heightened sense of
safety promoted by a manufacturer.
B.  History of Allocation of Fault in Alaska
The history of allocation of fault in Alaska is a history of
common law and judicial review, followed by a political modifica-
tion through legislative enactment.  The Alaska Supreme Court in
Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.48 discussed the legislative and common
law modifications to products liability law relating to allocation of
fault.  Because this doctrine “involves issues of distributive justice
and has attracted the attention of vocal and aggressive partisans,”49
it is no surprise that the current law reflects the political activity
that is associated with products liability.  More problematic is the
courts’ willingness to bend, if not capitulate, to the more political
aspects of these issues at the expense of legal continuity, logic and
basic principles of fairness.
By statute, Alaska law recognizes comparative fault in an ac-
tion “based on fault” as follows:
47. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Symposium: Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
259, 333-36 (2000).
48. 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
49. GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. xv (1998).
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In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury
or death to a person or harm to property, contributory fault
chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the
amount awarded as compensatory damages for the injury attrib-
utable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar re-
covery.50
A products liability case is not an action “based on fault” be-
cause it focuses on the product and not any individual’s conduct;
thus, this statute ostensibly should not apply to a products liability
case.  Alaska has refined allocation of fault even further, however,
in the context of products liability cases.51  Under state law, the
courts “shall instruct the jury” or make findings establishing the
amount of damages and the “percentage of the total fault that is
allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, per-
son who has been released from liability, or other person responsi-
ble for the damages . . . .”52  The statute requires the trier of fact to
“consider both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault,
and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the
damages claimed.”53
This statute has been applied in several cases.54  Since 1997, the
trier of fact under certain circumstances has been able to allocate
50. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Michie 2000).
51. In addition to the allocation formula set forth by statute, there is a defini-
tion of “fault” that expressly includes product misuse and products liability:
In this chapter, “fault” includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent, reckless, or intentional toward the person or property of the
actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability.  The term
also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not
constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for
which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure
to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.  Legal requirements of causal
relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory
fault.
Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 09.17.080(a).
53. Id. § 09.17.080(b).
54. See, e.g., GMC v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).  A prior ver-
sion of the statute was applied in Benner v. Wichman.  874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994).
In Benner, the court ruled that in order to invoke the allocation of fault principles
set forth in the pre-1997 statute, the party to whom fault was to be allocated had
to be made part of the action.  Id. at 958.  Thus a “party” within the meaning of §
09.17.080 was restricted to “parties to an action, including third-party defendants
and settling parties.”  Id.  The Benner court also concluded that “equity requires
that defendants have an avenue for bringing in others who may be liable to the
plaintiff.”  Id. at 956.  Such an action against a potentially responsible person can
be brought after the statute of limitations has expired and that party is neverthe-
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fault even to non-parties, with the proportionate reduction in the
defendant’s liability and plaintiff’s recovery for any such alloca-
tion.55  Importantly, any allocation of fault to a non-party may op-
erate to reduce the award to the plaintiff; however, there can be no
civil liability to the non-party, and the finding of fault “may not be
used as evidence of civil liability in another action.”56
While several states reject this approach and do not allow allo-
cation of fault in products liability cases,57 Alaska recognized early
in its products liability decisions, starting with Butaud v. Suburban
Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc. in 1976,58 that comparative fault
principles should be applied, particularly where there is product
misuse.59  The Ninth Circuit followed the Alaska Supreme Court’s
lead and held “that comparative fault (i.e., contributory negligence)
concepts can be applied to the doctrine of strict products liabil-
ity.”60  Subsequently, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized in
Dura Corp. v. Harned61 and Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck,62 two
types of comparative negligence in products liability cases: product
misuse and unreasonable and voluntary assumption of risk.  The
court in Ingersoll-Rand changed its reasoning by concluding that as
of 1986, with the enactment of the first statutory tort reform legis-
lation, even “ordinary negligence” is an affirmative defense in a
products liability action.63  The court reasoned that “[p]rior to the
Act, comparative negligence in products liability cases was limited
to product misuse and unreasonable assumption of risk.  The Act
less obligated for damages to the plaintiff.  Alaska Gen. Alarm v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d
98, 104 (Alaska 2000).
55. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(c) (Michie 2000).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 734 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.
1999) (“[T]his case falls within the general rule that contributory and comparative
negligence are not defenses to a strict product liability action.”); Kimco Dev.
Corp. v. Michael D’s Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1993); McCown v.
Int’l Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381, 382 (Pa. 1975).
58. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
59. The court in Bachner v. Pearson established that contributory negligence
was not a defense to a products liability claim unless “the plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably encounter[ed] a known risk.”  479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Alaska 1970).
60. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129,
1138 (9th Cir. 1977).
61. 703 P.2d 396, 403 (Alaska 1985) (recognizing the misuse defense).
62. 593 P.2d 871, 890-92 (Alaska 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 624
P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981) (recognizing the defense of unreasonable and voluntary
assumption of risk).
63. Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand, 14 P.3d 990, 996 (Alaska 2000).
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expands that definition to include other types of comparative fault,
including a plaintiff’s ordinary negligence.”64
C.  Conflict Between Allocation of Fault and Strict Liability
In Lewis v. Timco, Inc.,65 Judge Politz of the Fifth Circuit aptly
reasoned that the concept of “products strict liability [is] based on
the concern that the injured party cannot adequately protect him-
self from the potential harm.  Strict liability is based on a theory of
responsibility which requires no finding of fault.”66  In contrast, he
noted that allocating fault is determining blameworthiness:
Fault is blameworthiness.  “‘Fault’ in legal literature is the
equivalent of negligence.”  The concept of fault in negligence
law presupposes a particular duty or obligation to conform to a
certain standard of conduct and focuses upon the nature of the
act itself.  It notes only inferentially the instrument the actor uses
to bring about the result and the result itself.
Although fault may be present, there is no requirement of tradi-
tional fault in a strict liability situation.  The theory of strict li-
ability does not lend itself to a comparison of fault.  Some courts
and commentators have characterized the attempt as involving
“apples and oranges.” A more accurate analysis might charac-
terize the effort as an attempt to measure the amount of water in
an empty glass.  I find it simply illogical to attempt to quantify
fault where admittedly none exists.67
Notwithstanding the doctrinal conflict, the Alaska Supreme
Court has traditionally allowed comparative negligence in products
liability cases, noting that “it would be anomalous in a products li-
ability case to have damages mitigated if the plaintiff sues in negli-
gence, but allow him to recover full damages if he sues in strict li-
ability.”68  The court stated that “the public policy reasons for strict
product liability do not seem to be incompatible with comparative
negligence.  The manufacturer is still accountable for all the harm
from a defective product, except that part caused by the con-
sumer’s own conduct.”69
This position has been criticized as incompatible with the ap-
plication of products liability:
The Supreme Court of Alaska applied comparative negligence in
a strict liability case, stating “[a]lthough it is theoretically diffi-
64. Id.
65. 716 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. Id.
67. Lewis, 716 F.2d at 1434-35 (citations omitted).
68. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46
(Alaska 1976).
69. Id.
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cult for the legal purist to balance the seller’s strict liability
against the user’s negligence, this problem is more apparent than
real.”  I cannot agree.  This is more than simply a problem of
“legal purity.”  It presents a very practical problem, which the
court does not address.  Comparative fault assumes a real com-
parison.  The percentage of the plaintiff’s fault is determined in
relation to the defendant’s fault.  The amount of fault of a plain-
tiff is not determinable in a vacuum; it can only be measured as
against the culpability of the defendant.  I struggle to understand
how the fact-finder can appreciate and apply the concept of li-
ability without fault and, at the same time, compare relative per-
centages of fault when one of the parties is perhaps free of fault.
It appears that the fact-finder will be forced to make an ad hoc
determination of presumed fault on the part of the strictly liable
party and then factor this into a calculus of relative responsibil-
ity.70
Regardless of the merits of this criticism, this historical per-
spective is provided primarily to set the stage for the current issues
relating to safety products.  This Comment assumes that fault will
be allocated in products liability cases in the same manner as it is
allocated in negligence cases.  As is more fully addressed below, in
the area of safety products, the consumer’s own conduct is the very
purpose for the safety product.
D.  Current Application of Comparative Fault Principles in
Products Liability Cases Involving Safety Products
Alaska law recognizes three forms of product defect: a manu-
facturing defect, a design defect, or a failure to contain adequate
warnings.71  If one of these defects is established, the manufacturer
will be liable for that product defect if it caused injury, because
proof of a defect is “tantamount to ‘fault’ in the sense that we will
impose legal responsibility for it.”72 As discussed above, the “con-
cept of risk allocation has been the primary policy rationale” sup-
porting products liability,73 transferring the costs of product injuries
to the manufacturers74 rather than the injured consumers.
Notably, a products liability action isolates the condition of the
product itself from the question of the reasonableness of the manu-
70. Lewis, at 1436-37 (quoting Butaud, 555 P.2d at 45-46).
71. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992); see also
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878 n.15 (Alaska 1979), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981).
72. Beck, 593 P.2d at 889.
73. Id.
74. See supra nn.12-14 (discussing Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Ctr., Inc.,
454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969)).
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facturer’s conduct.75  Decision-making or marketing is not material
to whether the product is defective.76  Consistent with this, the
Alaska Supreme Court has rejected the incorporation of any type
of negligence terminology into products liability.77  The Alaska Su-
preme Court has also made clear that compliance with industry
standards or practices is not a defense in a products liability ac-
tion.78  The manufacturer is obligated to design a product that con-
siders not only the intended use of the product, but also any rea-
sonably foreseeable product use.79  In the case of safety products,
75. The reasonableness, or lack thereof, of a defendant’s conduct would be
relevant, however, if there is a claim for punitive damages, which by definition fo-
cuses on the defendant’s conduct and knowledge.  See Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v.
Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979).
76. See Beck, 593 P.2d at 883 (“The focus of strict products liability is on the
condition of the product, not on the manufacturing and marketing decision of the
defendant.”) (citing Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 325 (Alaska 1970)); see also
Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1352 (Alaska 1991) (“The focus in a
strict product liability case is on the product, not on the conduct of the defen-
dant.”).  The Alaska Supreme Court has admonished the trial courts that jury in-
structions in products liability cases should avoid negligence concepts and negli-
gence language by eliminating references to a defendant’s reasonableness.  See
Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199-200 (Alaska 1992); Patricia R. v. Sulli-
van, 631 P.2d 91, 102-03 (Alaska 1981) (reversing verdict because of negligence
language in jury instructions); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604
P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Alaska 1979).
77. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1062 (citations omitted).  The court in Heritage rea-
soned:
In the Beck case, we expressly rejected the approach taken by some legal
commentators of reinserting negligence terminology into the jury’s in-
quiry into the “diverse factors related to the product’s desirability and to
its dangerousness,” which is the crucial analysis in the jury’s overall de-
termination that a product’s design is defective and the manufacturer
should bear legal responsibility for the mistake.
Id.
78. Beck, 593 P.2d at 886 (noting that it is no defense even if “the manufac-
turer took reasonable precautions in an attempt to design a safe product or other-
wise acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer”) (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g
Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978)).
79. In determining whether a particular use (or misuse) is “foreseeable,” the
focus is on what is foreseeable to the manufacturer, not the consumer.  Such proof
includes what a reasonable manufacturer would have, or should have, known,
which is largely a negligence principle.  See Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671
P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska 1983); Lamer v. McKee Indus., Inc., 721 P.2d 611, 615
(Alaska 1986).
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the reasonably foreseeable uses include, by definition, someone’s
negligence or carelessness.80
Some safety products, particularly those products used in or by
vehicles, are referred to in the context of “crashworthiness.”81  The
“crashworthiness doctrine,” also known as the “enhanced injury
doctrine” or “second collision doctrine,” is an evolving area of
products liability law nationally82 and a recent development in
Alaska.83  This doctrine recognizes that a vehicle occupant may be
injured by, or have enhanced injuries from, the very product that
was supposed to prevent or reduce injuries, such as a seatbelt or an
airbag.84  The crashworthiness doctrine acknowledges that injuries
sustained in an accident may occur not only because of the initial
impact of the vehicle, but also because of a subsequent impact of
the occupant with the vehicle itself.85  The crashworthiness of a ve-
hicle can be measured by the degree to which it protects the occu-
pants from injury inside the vehicle during this “second collision.”
The doctrine has been applied to cars, motorcycles, trucks, air-
planes, helicopters and boats.86  Liability may be imposed for prod-
uct defects if the occupants’ injuries were enhanced as a result of a
design defect in the vehicle.  Studies have examined safety prod-
ucts, such as head restraints, for effectiveness and the possibility of
exacerbating injuries.87  The focus on safety products is whether the
80. See, e.g., Larsen v. GMC, 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (“[An automo-
bile] should provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably pos-
sible under the present state of the art . . . .  Collisions with or without fault of the
user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.”).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a (1997); see id. § 17, § 2 cmt. p
(“[A]n automobile may be defectively designed so as to provide inadequate pro-
tection against harm in the event of a collision.”).  See generally General Motors
Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Alaska 1998).
82. In one of the earliest cases in this area, the court held that a “manufacturer
is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subject-
ing the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.”  See Lar-
sen, 394 F.2d at 502.
83. See generally Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1209.  Farnsworth is the first Alaska
case to address the crashworthiness doctrine directly.
84. See generally Larsen, 391 F.2d at 501-02; see also Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at
1219 (noting that “a crashworthiness claim rests on the idea that a defect en-
hanced the plaintiff’s injuries”).
85. Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 7 (Wis. 1984)
(noting that the plaintiff’s injury was not from the accident but occurred “as a re-
sult of his impact with defective seats”).
86. Lory J. Kraut, Crashworthiness, Strict Liability: On a Collision Course, 57
DEF. COUNS. J. 150, 150 (1990).
87. One study summarized its findings on head restraints, reasoning:
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product worked as designed, i.e., whether it reduced or eliminated
the risk of injury or death, and in defect cases, whether the product
enhanced injuries or failed.
IV. SAFETY PRODUCTS: CONSUMER MARKETING AND PRODUCT
DESIGN THAT ANTICIPATES NEGLIGENCE
A.  Role of Human Error in Product Development
Each discrete line of safety products referenced in this Com-
ment involves, in some manner, a marketing and design program
that expressly accounts for human error, misjudgment, careless-
ness, and the many circumstances summarized as comparative neg-
ligence or third-party negligence.  A leading engineering group is-
sued a report that discussed the role of error and human factors in
designing products:
Despite great advances in technology, computational tools, in-
formation transmission and even our understanding of human
factors, many designs still do not live up to user expectations or
they fail in service for a variety of reasons.  Interestingly enough,
while the current legal climate in the United States encourages
the most detailed and expensive investigations into design fail-
ures it doesn’t always help in forestalling future occurrences of
the same nature . . . . Whether a design failure results in acciden-
tal injury to a user or simply an argument over monetary loss,
the underlying problems very often boil down to defects in the
engineering design process itself.
Techniques such as safe-life design, fail-safe design, redundant
design and hazard analysis must be considered as integral parts of
the product development, and not simply as “add-ons” at the end
of the project.88
It is generally accepted that the incidence of whiplash associated disor-
ders is increasing in all industrialised countries, despite the almost uni-
versal fitment of head restraints in at least the front seats of cars.  This is
usually attributed to the fact that few people can be observed to follow
the standard recommendations as regards head restraint positioning, that
is, level with the head vertically and as close to the head as possible hori-
zontally.  This study set out to determine whether any other factors, in
addition to head restraint adjustment, could be found which would influ-
ence the severity of whiplash injury . . . The beneficial effects of good
head restraint adjustment could not be clearly demonstrated, and some
trends, especially in rear impacts, where the benefits of a well-adjusted re-
straint should have been very clear, indicated that larger distances from
head to restraint were associated with lower disability.
R. Minton et al., Whiplash Injury—Are Current Head Restraints Doing Their Job?,
32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 177, 177-85 (2000) (emphasis added).
88. Crispen Hales, Ten Critical Factors in the Design Process, in SAFETY BRIEF
VOL. 19, NO. 1, at 1-7 (2001) (emphasis added).
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Thus, design engineers are expected to account for human error as
an “integral part of the product development.”  In assessing a de-
sign defect case involving a safety product, consumer negligence
and third-party negligence should be factored in as elements of the
defective design at least equally and perhaps more so than simply
as factors to allocate fault.
B.  The Role of Human Error and Safety Helmets
Helmets are designed and marketed for bicycle safety,89 mo-
torcycle safety, mountaineering, skiing and construction work,
among other uses.  Studies have concluded, for example, that bicy-
cle “helmets decrease the risk of head and brain injury by 70 to 88
percent and facial injury to the upper and mid face by 65 percent.”90
Independent and manufacturer-sponsored studies are then touted
in promotional campaigns by manufacturers.  For example, one
manufacturer advertises that its bicycle helmet provides “[t]op-
protection for children and teens with proven safety design pro-
viding particular protection for temples and neck.”91  It would not
be unreasonable for a consumer to buy this helmet for a child or a
teen because it has a “proven safety design” and provides “par-
ticular protection for temples and neck,” two likely areas for bicy-
cle injuries.  Other manufacturers92 point out that they follow the
89. In one study, the authors noted the problem of bicycle injuries where no
helmets were used:
Each year, approximately 750 persons die from injuries due to bicycle
crashes and over 500,000 persons are treated in emergency departments.
While over 90% of deaths from bicycle-related injuries are caused by
collisions with motor vehicles, these collisions cause less than 25% of
non-fatal head injuries.  Head injury is by far the greatest risk posed to
bicyclists, comprising one-third of emergency department visits, two-
thirds of hospital admissions, and three-fourths of deaths.
Unfortunately, the ubiquity of the bicycle lends the greatest risk of injury
to children, who often do not practice proper riding habits or wear bicy-
cle helmets.  Consequently, 30 percent of bicyclist deaths occur in the 5-
14 year old age group.  At least 125 children die from bicycle-related
brain injuries each year (NCHS 1998).  Approximately one-fifth of the
100,000 children who sustain a non-fatal injury to the head or face while
riding each year, sustain a traumatic brain injury (USCPSC 1999).
Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center, University of Washington,
Systematic Reviews of Childhood Injury Prevention Interventions - Bicycle Injuries
Scope of the Problem, at http://depts.washington.edu/hipre/childinjury/topic/
bicycles (last updated July 5, 2001).
90. Id.
91. See Promotional Material for Firesprinter Zoom 2, available at
www.abus.de/ez/ezfh44.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
92. According to the Bicycle Helmet Safety Institute, Bell, a manufacturer of
helmets, “is the only helmet manufacturer who has joined the Consumer Product
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Consumer Product Safety Commission’s “Ten Safety Principles”93
as part of their marketing and design programs.
The Bicycle Safety Helmet Institute notes that “[f]rom the
consumer’s point of view there are very protective helmets out
there for reasonable prices.”94  The Institute notes, however, that
there are design differences that relate to safety, including, for ex-
ample, that “the aero shape is a less than optimal design for crash-
ing.”95
A hypothetical situation involving an “aero” design helmet il-
lustrates this situation. 96  The helmet is one which at least some in-
Safety Commission’s (“CPSC”) Product Safety Circle.  We are not sure how much
that actually means to the consumer, but they have pledged to follow [the] ten
safety principles, designate a corporate safety officer and publicize their successes
in implementing the principles.”  Bicycle Helmet Safety Institute, Bicycle Helmets
for the 2002 Season, at http://www.bhsi.org/helmet02.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2002). Certainly a consumer could argue that this manufacturer was promoting its
safety practices and the focus on safety design with its product.
93. On October 5, 2000, the CPSC announced a “Top Ten List” of corporate
product safety principles and urged manufacturers to voluntarily comply with
these principles. The principles are:
(1) Build safety into product design.
(2) Do product safety testing for all foreseeable hazards.
(3) Keep informed about and implement latest developments in product
safety.
(4) Educate consumers about product safety.
(5) Track and address your products’ safety performance.
(6) Fully investigate product safety incidents.
(7) Report product safety defects promptly.
(8) If a defect occurs, promptly offer a comprehensive recall plan.
(9) Work with CPSC to make sure your recall is effective.
(10) Learn from mistakes - yours and others’.
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Chairman Ann
Brown Unveils Product Safety Institute “Top Ten List” of Safety Principles Aimed
at Reducing Number of Recalls (Oct. 5, 2000), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/
cpscpub/prerel/prhtml01/01003.html.
94. Bicycle Safety Helmet Institute, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. Design defects in bicycling helmets have been the subject of several cases.
See Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the district court properly granted manufacturer’s motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury to
parts of her body not covered by the helmet); Braverman v. Kucharik Bicycle
Clothing Co., 678 N.E.2d 80, 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting that consumer’s expert
testified that the helmet “was defectively designed, unreasonably dangerous, and
not fit for its intended use.  The leather polyester-filled helmet failed to provide
any protection around and above the ear area.”); Berkner v. Bell Helmets, Inc.,
822 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that summary judgment was ap-
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dustry experts have reason to believe contains a design defect be-
cause the design allows the “helmet to snag on the surface when
you hit . . . [and this] can shove the helmet aside as you hit.”97
Imagine a consumer, wearing such a helmet, who is riding too fast
to control the bicycle, crashes, and is rendered quadriplegic be-
cause his helmet “snagged on the surface.”98  Experts are willing to
testify that the “aero” design is defective and had a different design
been used, the plaintiff would not have been injured.  Applying the
allocation of fault principles adopted by statute and as employed
by the court in Farnsworth,99 the trier of fact would be asked to de-
termine the fault of both parties.  Since the hypothetical bike rider
was riding too fast and lost control, it would not be unfair for the
trier of fact to assign 100 percent of the liability to this carelessness.
Had the consumer been riding more slowly, he would not have lost
control, and had he not lost control, he would not have been in-
jured.  The defect in the design of the helmet would be secondary
because its “fault” arises only after the plaintiff fails to exercise
reasonable care.
In Mine Safety Co. v. Stiles,100 decided before Farnsworth, a
worker on an oil drilling platform was hit in the head while wearing
a safety helmet designed to protect against such blows.  Stiles was
hit when a metal hole cover fell from the floor above.101  The hel-
met cracked and the suspension clips broke upon impact.102  Under
current law, the helmet manufacturer could shift fault away from
any product defect and instead focus on the initial cause of the in-
jury—negligent co-workers who dropped a 58-pound hole cover
from two stories above his head.  If this case had been decided on
its merits, the trier of fact would probably have little doubt that the
injury would never have happened if these workers were properly
trained or supervised.  Thus, under current law, the co-workers
would bear most, if not all, of the culpability when compared to the
helmet manufacturer.  Their negligence essentially trumps any po-
propriate for manufacturer because it was open and obvious that helmet was not a
lighter color and did not have reflective material).
97. Bicycle Helmet Safety Institute, available at http://www.helmets.org/
 helmet01.htm (last modified Nov. 26, 2001).
98. Id.
99. GMC v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998).
100. 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988). The decision in Stiles turned on whether he
timely filed his products liability suit (he did not), but the facts are worth discuss-
ing here because the manner of injury was obviously caused by someone’s care-
lessness.  Id. at 292.
101. Id. at 289.
102. Id.
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tential defect in the helmet; determining whether the helmet is de-
fective is more an academic exercise than a substantive attempt to
ascertain potential responsibility for a defective product.  The cur-
rent law allows a trier of fact to conclude that the helmet defect is
superfluous and assign 100 percent fault to the negligent co-
workers.
Though not a helmet case, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck pre-
sents a good example of the inappropriate application of allocation
of fault principles to negligent users of safety products if modified
slightly for purposes of discussion.103  In Beck, the estate of the de-
cedent, a construction worker who died when the loader that he
was operating rolled over an embankment, claimed that construc-
tion equipment was defectively designed because the manufacturer
failed to install a protective roll bar.104  A roll bar is, of course, a
safety product.  If we change the facts, for purposes of discussion,
we can see the impact the current allocation of fault paradigm may
have on a similar case.  Assume a roll bar was installed, and assume
that when the loader rolled, the roll bar collapsed because of a
product defect, and the driver was injured or killed.
The purpose of installing the roll bar in the first place is the
knowledge that loaders can tip and roll if the loader driver mis-
judges the incline of a slope or improperly carries a load in the
bucket.  The loader could roll for other reasons as well, such as un-
stable soils.  It would not be difficult to establish that, in any of
these circumstances, either the driver or the employer was negli-
gent in causing the loader to roll because of unsafe driving or im-
proper soil preparation.  Under post-Farnsworth reasoning and ap-
plication of the statute,105 the negligence of the driver or of the
employer could readily account for 100 percent of the cause in fact
of the injuries, notwithstanding a defective roll bar.  Again, such a
result would provide no incentive to manufacturers to produce
non-defective safety products, even though the manufacturer had
the potential negligence of other individuals in mind when it de-
signed the product.
The end result is that pure allocation of fault, when applied to
safety products, may result in such a dramatically reduced potential
for liability that the essential purposes of products liability could be
thwarted.  Thus, the true costs of product-related injuries may not
103. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981).
104. Id. at 874-75.
105. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Michie 2000).  This statute describes how the
court allocates a specific percentage of fault to each defendant when more than
one defendant is liable for causing injury.
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be transferred to the manufacturers, and the incentive to produce
safer products may be eliminated.  A fair examination of this issue
should convince either the courts or the legislature that this result
is not desirable.
V.  CONCLUSION
Society is served when manufacturers design products that in-
clude safety features and safety products.  The goals of products li-
ability are undermined when a manufacturer of a safety product is
allowed to essentially escape liability by allocating fault to the
“original tortfeasor” because the safety product was designed with
that original tortfeasor in mind.
A more appropriate resolution of the issues in Farnsworth
may have been the conclusion that the “original tortfeasor” was the
safety product manufacturer whose product allegedly failed to
work for the passenger.  The product was designed just in case one
or more drivers were negligent.  Allowing allocation of fault to the
negligent drivers allows the manufacturer to transfer the costs of its
defective product to others and eliminates any incentive to produce
a safer product.  This result undermines products liability doctrine
and erodes consumer protection.  A common law modification and
interpretation of the products liability laws could extend the statu-
tory allocation of fault only to circumstances that do not involve
safety products.  The application of the “original tortfeasor” doc-
trine to pure allocation of fault was done as a matter of common
law; it can certainly be revised on the same basis.  Additionally, the
legislature could expressly address this issue and determine that it
should not be the public policy of Alaska to diminish the incentive
for product manufacturers to address defects in their safety prod-
ucts and reduce injuries to Alaskans.
